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ABSTRACT 
Increased regional inequality has been a major concern in many emerging 
economies like China, India, Vietnam and Thailand.  However, even a large inequality is 
observed within the lagging regions.  The objective of this paper is to look into what are 
the sources of within region inequality using the community surveys and a census type of 
households in Western China. 
This snapshot view of inequality within and between rural villages in western 
China is based on a census-type household survey in three administrative villages and a 
sampling survey of 286 natural villages in the poor province of Guizhou in 2004. In 
contrast to coastal regions, nonfarm income is distributed unevenly in this inland western 
region. This accounts for the largest share of overall income inequality. But agriculture is 
still the rural people’s major source of livelihood in this particular location. On the 
expenditure side, health care is one of the most important sources of inequality. Because 
rural income is strongly related to human capital, the uneven access to health care will 
translate into a larger income gap in the long run. The analysis based on the natural 
village survey indicates that income varies widely across villages. Access to 
infrastructure and markets, education, and political participation explain most of this 
variation.   
These findings have important implications on the future development strategy in 
promoting lagging regions development and poverty reduction.  While the overall 
economic development will be the main instrument to bring the majority poor out of 
poverty, a targeted approach has become increasingly crucial in helping the poor villages 
and households.  It is critical to understand why these villages and households can not 
particulate in the growth process and how development programs and various transfer 
programs help them to overcome the constraints they face.   
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VILLAGE INEQUALITY IN WESTERN CHINA: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
IN LAGGING REGIONS 
 




China’s rapid economic growth has dramatically reduced the number of poor 
people over several decades. However, in the past several years, the pace of poverty 
reduction has halted. The total number of absolute poor has stagnated between 26 and 30 
million (China Agricultural Development Report 2005), and the gap between the general 
population and the absolute poor has increased sharply
2.  Regardless of the source of 
data, it is clear that the incidence of rural poverty is significantly higher in western China, 
a region characterized by poor agricultural land and weak infrastructure (World Bank 
2000; Xian and Sheng 2001).  Based on the World Bank’s estimates, the poverty rate 
averaged 19 percent in the northwest region and 11 percent in the southwest region in 
1996, while the comparable figure for the whole country was 6 percent.  In contrast, in 
that same year, only 1.2 percent of the rural population was living under the poverty line 
in the eastern region and 2.6 percent in the central region.  Moreover, the reduction in the 
incidence of rural poverty was not as dramatic in western China as it was in the other 
regions.  Consequently, rural poverty is increasingly concentrated in the western 
                                                 
1 Li Xing is from the International Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (ICARD), Chinese 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS); Shenggen Fan is from the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and ICARD; Xiaopeng Luo is from Center for Poverty Alleviation Research, Guizhou 
University, China; and Xiaobo Zhang is from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
2 China’s official poverty line is 300 yuan per capita income in 1990, equivalent to $0.66 per day measured 
in 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) (World Bank 2000).  The poverty line is defined as the level below 
which income (and food production in rural areas) is below subsistence levels for food intake, shelter, and 
clothing.  Using this poverty line, the incidence of poverty is less than 3 percent.  In 2004, the number of 
poor declined by 2.9 million to 26.1 million after a few years of stagnation.  This decline was probably 
caused by a combination of the new rural income support policy, a rapid increase in agricultural prices, and 
good weather.  In 1998, China also used a higher poverty line of 865 yuan per capita consumption per year, 
which is equivalent to $1.17 international dollars without adjusting for rural/urban differences in the cost of 
living (Xian and Sheng 2001).  Using a poverty line of $1.08 consumption per capita per day, measured in 
1993 PPP dollars, the incidence of rural poverty was 16.6 percent in 2001, and the number of rural poor 
was 211.6 million (Chen and Ravallion 2004).   viii
provinces.  The southwest and northwest regions together accounted for about 70 percent 
of the total rural poor in China in 1996, an increase of 40 percentage points over 1988.  
Why have the gains of economic growth not trickled down to the remaining poor?  
The existence of a large number of absolute poor and rising inequality are a 
breeding ground for social instability.  In a close community, people may not feel much 
deprived if their neighbors are equally poor.  However, rising inequality within a small, 
closed community is likely to increase the level of anxiety and animosity.  Therefore, it is 
imperative to study the patterns and correlates of inequality within a community, in 
particular in rural villages, as most people still live there.  
There is a large body of literature on inequality in China (Rozelle 1994; Khan and 
Riskin 1998; Gustafson and Li 1998; Kanbur and Zhang 1999; Li et al. 2000; RCRE 
2001; Zhang 2001; Morduch and Sicular 2002; Zhou and Wan 2003; Huang, Wang, and 
Wan 2003; Huang, Zhang, and Wang 2006; Wang and Wen 2005).  Many of these 
studies use aggregate data, while some are based on household survey data.  Yet few 
studies have paid attention to inequality within or between villages, largely due to the 
lack of data.  The widely used household survey data set collected by the Research Center 
for Rural Economy (RCRE), Ministry of Agriculture of China include at most 10 
households in a village.  Although such data are helpful for measuring overall rural 
inequality, they are less useful for discerning the true degree of inequality within a 
village.  Moreover, most rural poor people reside in mountainous areas and are usually 
sparsely spread around natural villages (or subvillages) instead of administrative villages 
(World Bank 2000; Park and Wang 2001).  A natural village occurs when households 
cluster together, forming a small community.  An administrative village is a region 
consisting of several villages designated by the state as a unit for administrative 
purposes.
3  Natural villages in western China are the most basic unit of community.  To 
                                                 
3 The Chinese administrative systems consist of the following levels: national, provincial, prefecture, 
county, and township.  While all these levels have governments, an administrative village is a region 
consisting of several villages designated by the state as a unit for administrative purposes and is not a level 
of government.     ix
our knowledge, there have been no studies that examine the patterns of inequality within 
and between villages.  This study aims to fill this knowledge gap.  
On the policy front, China’s poverty alleviation strategy has shifted from regional 
targeting to community and household targeting.  In order to better target the poor, it is 
essential to know who they are and why they are poor.  This again requires detailed 
information at the household and community level.  To address these questions, the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chinese Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences (CAAS), and Guizhou University conducted a joint survey in impoverished 
Puding County of Guizhou Province, the poorest province in China, at the beginning of 
2005.  All the households in three administrative villages and over 700 households in 286 
natural villages in four townships were surveyed.  
The following section presents background information about the survey.  In the 
third section, we examine the patterns of inequality within villages, and apply a 
regression approach to uncover the major correlates of income in the three villages.  The 
fourth section reports on the pattern and correlates of income distribution across natural 
and administrative villages.  The paper ends with conclusions and policy implications. 
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II.  SURVEY SITES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Puding County, located in the central part of Guizhou Province, was selected as 
the survey site.  The selection of Guizhou Province hardly needs any justification.  It is 
one of the poorest provinces in China.  In 1998, the last year when data are available, the 
poverty rate in Guizhou was 42 percent, compared with a national average of 22 percent 
(Xian and Sheng 2001).  Its per capita income ranked last among 31 provinces in 
mainland China in 2004.  Puding County is one of 592 counties designated as poor by the 
central government.
7  It has 11 townships, 317 administrative villages, and a total 
population of 402,000.  About 94 percent of the total population resides in rural areas, 
and agricultural labor amounts to 217,000, or 63 percent of total labor.  The county has 
more than 20 ethnic groups, including Han, Miao, Buyi, Gelao, and Yi.  The minority 
population (all except the majority Han) accounts for about 20 percent of total 
population.  With the implementation of a national program called the “8–7 Poverty 
Alleviation Project,” the number of people living under the poverty line in Puding has 
declined from 215,000 in 1993 to 88,000 in 2002 (PAO 2003).
8  By the end of 2002, 
                                                 
7 A poverty alleviation program was not effectively formulated until 1986.  As the program’s first step, the 
central government designated 331 poor counties (roughly 16 percent of the total) based on per capita rural 
income.  These counties received special funds from the central government for the explicit purpose of 
poverty alleviation.  One billion yuan (in current prices) was allocated in 1986 alone.  An additional 800 
million yuan was added annually in subsequent years.  These funds were supposed to be used as direct 
loans to poor farmers or to rural enterprises.  In 1991, 236 more counties were designated as poor and 
received 500 million yuan in loans for poverty reduction.  In 1993, the designation of poor counties was 
adjusted based on changes in income and price indices.  The number of poor counties was thereafter fixed 
at 592.  Most of these counties are in the border and mountainous areas of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, 
Shaanxi, Shanxi, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Gansu. 
 
8 In September 1993, the State Council approved the National Poverty Relief Program, or the so-called 8-7 
Poverty Alleviation Project, which aimed to ensure adequate food and clothing for the existing 80 million   11
there were 120,000 people, or 31% of the total rural population, earning less than 865 
yuan per capita (PAO 2003).  In order to understand the patterns of income distribution at 
different levels, the units of observation in our survey are households and natural 
villages.  Table 1 shows the size of each sample in the survey.  We first selected four 
townships—Chengguan, Maguan, Bulang, and Houchang, based on the level of economic 
development.  Chengguan Township is located in the county seat of Puding, about 120 
kilometers from Guiyang, the capital city of Guizhou Province, and 20 kilometers from 
the prefecture city of Anshun.  Both in terms of area and population, Chengguan is the 
largest among the four townships.  It encompasses 46 administrative villages and a 
geographic area of 146 square kilometers.  Its industrial output accounts for about 80 
percent of the county’s gross output value.  Maguan Township enjoys an even better 
location because it sits right between Chengguan Township and the much bigger city of 
Anshun, and it is only 18 kilometers away from the Anshun Economic and Technology 
Zone.
9  In addition, the Anshun Power Plant, a government-owned enterprise, is located 
in the township, providing plentiful opportunities for employment and fiscal revenues.  
Maguan is the most prosperous township in Puding County.  Bulang Township is 23 
kilometers northwest of the county seat with 16 administrative villages.  It has rich 
natural resources, including a hydroelectric power station, coal mines, and iron mines.  
Houchang Township is the most remote of the four townships.  It is 41 kilometers away 
from the county seat and includes both the highest and the lowest points of latitude of the 
county.  It has 17 administrative villages and ranks as one of the poorest townships in the 
county.   
                                                                                                                                                 
poor within seven years (from 1994 to 2000)..  At the same time, the Leading Group for Economic 
Development of Impoverished Areas was renamed the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty 
Alleviation and Development. 
9 The special economic zone is a special geographic area designated by different levels of government to 
attract foreign and domestic investment by offering free or low taxes and land use. 12 
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In Chengguan Township, a census household survey of about 800 households in 
three administrative villages was conducted.
10  Table 2 presents the summary statistics of 
the survey for three randomly chosen villages in Chengguan Township.  This survey 
includes the characteristics of household and family members (such as employment and 
health), income sources, expenditure components (including productive and living 
expenditures), and land area.
11  Details on the measures of income and expenditure are 
provided in the Appendix.  
Table 2.  Summary Statistics in Three Villages of Chengguan Township, 2004 
 1  2  3  Average/Overall 
Population share  0.343  0.182  0.475  1.000 
Per capita net income (yuan)  992  1,100  1,590  1,298 
Income share  0.262  0.154  0.584  1.000 
Per capita expenditure (yuan)  770.8  963.5  1,340  1,075 
Gini in expenditure  0.345  0.391  0.353  0.383 
GE in expenditure  0.206  0.263  0.222  0.254 
Gini in Income  0.403  0.424  0.409  0.425 
GE in income  0.280  0.339  0.288  0.319 
Data source: authors’ calculation. 
a Excluding agricultural productive expenditure. 
 
The first village is the farthest away from major markets and the county seat and 
therefore has the worst road connections and the fewest nonfarm job opportunities.  Its 
                                                 
10 The official number of residents in the three villages is 987, while the  survey could locate only 805 
households.  After data cleaning, 803 households were kept in our analysis. 
11 Puding County was a designated impoverished county by the central government in 1986, and in 2002 
and was on the list for a national program, “Key Counties of Poverty Alleviation and Development in State 
New Era”.   14
average per capita income is only 992 yuan.  The third village is near the county seat and 
has more nonfarm employment opportunities.  It is the richest among the three with a per 
capita income of 1,590 yuan.  Per capita income of the second village is 1,100 yuan, 
falling between that of the first and third villages.  The average per capita income in the 
three villages is 1,298 yuan in 2004, comparable to the county average of 1,559 yuan in 
2003 (PSB 2004).  In the sample, 30 percent of the total population falls below the 
official poverty line of 865 yuan, and 10 percent lives on fewer than 500 yuan per year.  
Table 1 also presents per capita income in the four townships from the 286 natural 
villages.  In each natural village, we asked a village leader to identify three typical 
households representing high, intermediate, and low income as well as their 
corresponding population shares.
12  We then interviewed the three households using the 
same questionnaire that was used for the census household survey in the three villages in 
Chengguan Township.  Using population as a weight, we were able to calculate the 
average per capita income and expenditure per year by natural village.  The average per 
capita income per year varies from 1,140 yuan in Houchang Township to 1,890 yuan in 
Maguan Township.  
 
                                                 
12 In Chengguan, we only interviewed one household with median income in each natural village as 
identified by village leaders.  The measurement errors were minimal because we found a high correlation 
between the median income and average calculated income from the three surveyed households in every 
natural village in the other three townships.    15
III.  INEQUALITY WITHIN VILLAGES 
The Patterns of Village Inequality 
As a first step, we make use of the census household survey in three 
administrative villages to examine income distribution within villages.  Table 2 reports 
the two common measures of inequality in income and expenditure, the Gini coefficient 
and Generalized Entropy (GE) in three villages in Chengguan Township.
13  F o r  t h e  
outcome variable of income, the overall Gini coefficient for the three villages is high at 
0.425 and the GE is 0.319.  Income inequality across the villages does not show much 
difference, with the Gini coefficient ranging from 0.403 in the first village to 0.424 in the 
second village.  A Gini coefficient of a magnitude of approximately 0.4 implies a rather 
uneven income distribution in rural communities.  The results for inequality in 
expenditures show a similar picture.  So the next question is: what are the major 
correlates of the observed high inequality?  
We next apply Shorrocks’ method of decomposing the overall income and 
expenditure inequality into factor components (Shorrocks 1982, 1984).  Table 3 presents 
the results of inequality decompositions by income source as well as the corresponding 
shares of income and expenditures.  Net agricultural income accounts for 49 percent of 
total rural income with a contribution to total variation of 33 percent.  The uneven 
distribution of agricultural income is the second most important factor contributing to the 
overall income inequality, while disparity in local income stemming from nonfarm jobs 
and wage jobs ranks as the first one.  Self-employment generates only about 5 percent of 
                                                 
13 The GE is a family of inequality measures that depend upon the selected value for the parameter c in the 
formula.  We only report GE when c = 0. The results for GE with other parameters are similar.  When c = 
0, GE is the mean logarithm deviation and more sensitive to the bottom part of the distribution.   
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total income; however, it accounts for more than one-fifth of total variation, suggesting 
that the distribution of entrepreneurship is rather unequal.   








Agriculture   48.81   33.00 
   Net income from farming   39.86   26.10 
   Net income from livestock   8.95   6.90 
Local nonfarm jobs  27.32   33.34 
Remittance from nonfarm jobs outside home  7.89   9.67 
Self-employment 4.57    21.34 
Disaster relief, antipoverty programs,  
Subsidy for reforestation and others 
a    2.73   0.58 
Selling blood   8.68   2.07 
    
Expenditures    
Agricultural input  21.31  21.26 
Farming (seeds, fertilizer, and pesticide, 




    Breeding (breeder, feedstuffs, epidemic 
prevention) 
6.29 12.82 
Consumption and other expenditure   74.20  70.27 
    Food, clothing, and fuel  50.29  25.89 
    Medical care  14.20  35.93 
    Education   6.99  6.11 
    Others (household services, etc.)  2.72  2.34 
Rural nonfarm expenses  4.49  8.47 
Data source: Author’s calculation. 
a  Excluding the social network inside rural areas. 
Remittances from migrants make up nearly 8 percent of total income and 10 
percent of the overall inequality.  Income from transfers such as poverty alleviation 
programs, reforestation projects, and disaster relief minimally affect income and overall 
inequality.  Farmers in the area often sell their blood for extra income.  Revenues from 
sale of blood are even larger than remittances, although their contribution to total   17
inequality is smaller.  Among our sample, nearly 30 percent of households reported that 
they sold blood in 2004.  Although income from blood sales provides farmers with 
necessary cash and helps smooth consumption, in the long run selling blood may 
adversely affect their health status, which in turn may reduce their income-generating 
capacity.  
Table 3 decomposes expenditure inequality according to agricultural inputs, rural 
nonfarm inputs, and consumption expenditures.  Daily living expenses account for more 
than 74 percent of total income and variation.  In poor regions, meeting basic needs is 
still the major task for most people.  Therefore, income inequality is closely related to 
living expenditure inequality.  Although on average medical care spending accounts for 
only 14 percent of total living expenditure, its contribution to total inequality is high at 36 
percent.  Our survey indicates that 41 percent of residents recommended for 
hospitalization refused to be admitted, with some 33 percent citing cost as the major 
reason.  Without an appropriate public health care system in place in rural areas, poor 
households are particularly prone to fall into poverty traps when a family member suffers 
a catastrophic illness.  
Education is another important factor, accounting for about 7 percent of total 
expenditure and its variation.  The high tuition and related fees for education have 
become a big burden for many poor households.  Not surprisingly, health care and 
education alone explain 42 percent of the total variation in living expenditures, 
suggesting that the lack of public provision of health care and education in rural areas 
might well be a major cause of inequality.  
Income Correlates  
Having examined the patterns of inequality, we are now in a position to 
investigate the correlates of rural income.  According to economic theories, income can   18
be generated from human capital (education and health), political and social capital, and 
physical capital (possessed assets).  Of course, household characteristics, such as 
household size and age structure, may also matter to income.  Based on these 
considerations, we include four categories of variables—household characteristics, 
human capital, social capital, and household assets—in our regressions on income 
determinants.  
Table 4.  Descriptive Analysis of Variables  
Variable   Explanation   Mean  Std. E  Min  Max 
Household and Members Characteristics 
Hhsize    Number of household members (in log format)  1.524   0.370   0.000   2.398  
Hhrelg    Having religious faith as 1 and 0 otherwise  0.098   0.298   0.000   1.000  
Hhnaty    Han ethnicity as 1 and 0 otherwise  0.682   0.466   0.000   1.000  
Hhmarg    Marriage status of household head (defined as 1 if 
married and 0 otherwise)  0.971   0.168   0.000   1.000  
Hhsex    A binary variable defined as 1 when household 
head is male and 0 otherwise  0.951   0.215   0.000   1.000  
Hhage    Age of household head  45.499  12.934   21.000   87.000 
Human capital  
Maxeduh    Max years of schooling among household 
members  5.468   3.531   0.000   17.000 
Trainingh    At least one household member received training 
as 1 and 0 otherwise  0.104   0.306   0.000   1.000  
Oldh    Proportion of seniors older than 60 years to total 
number of household members  0.103   0.215   0.000   1.000  
Bigsick    Households reporting medical expenditures as the 
largest spending item as 1, otherwise as 0  0.213   0.409   0.000   1.000  
Oldbigsick    Interaction of OLDH and BIGSICK  0.027   0.122   0.000   1.000  
Social capital   
Sc    Binary variable defined as 1 if household has 
relatives or friends who are officials and 0 
otherwise 
0.127   0.333   0.000   1.000  
Partyh    Household head is Communist Party member as 1 
and 0 otherwise  0.069   0.254   0.000   1.000  
Household assets 
Elec    Having access to electricity as 1 and 0 otherwise  0.979   0.142   0.000  1.000   
Asset   Having productive building or agricultural 
machinery as 1 and 0 otherwise.  0.448   0.498   0.000   1.000  
Llivst    Number of livestock in household  1.819   1.006   0.000   5.000  
Pirrland    Per capita irrigated land (Chinese mu)  0.126   0.211   0.000   3.000 
Prland   Per capita net rented land (Chinese mu)  0.133 0.394 0.000 3.750 
Pcland   Per capita contracted land (Chinese mu)  0.735   0.588  0.000   6.000  
Pland    Per capita arable land (Chinese mu)  0.914   0.765   0.000   8.333    19
Table 4 describes the major variables used in the econometric analysis.   
Regarding household characteristics, a typical rural household has four members, 10 
percent of households reported having a religious faith, 69 percent are of Han ethnicity, 
95 percent of household heads are males, and the average age of the head of household is 
45 years old.  In terms of human and social capital variables, the average number of years 
of schooling is about five years.  Ten percent of households report having received 
agricultural and technical training.  The ratio of seniors older than 60 years old is about 
10 percent of the total population.  Twenty-one percent of the households rank 
expenditure on medical care as the top item in total living costs.  About 13 percent of 
households have relatives or friends who are government officials, while the share of 
household heads who are Communist Party members is 7 percent.  Among the variables 
on household assets, 98 percent of households have access to electricity, and 45 percent 
have productive building or agricultural machinery.  Irrigated land per capita is 0.126 mu: 
on average each person owns only 0.914 mu of arable land, but there is a wide variation 
ranging from 0 to 8.33 mu.
14  
Table 5 reports the result of regressions in four specifications.  In the above 
decomposition analysis, we find that medical expenditures are the most important 
contributing factor to overall expenditure inequality.  Therefore we pay particular 
attention to the potential impact of health by adding an interactive term (Oldh*Bigsick) of 
demographic structures (Oldh is the proportion of senior people in the family and Bigsick 
denotes health shocks in the first and third specifications.  Considering that land has not 
been adjusted in Guizhou since the rural reforms in the early 1980s, we divide per capita 
cultivated land into two components in the third and fourth regressions: per capita 
contracted landholding and per capita land renting.  In the second specification, the 
                                                 
14 One mu =1/15 hectare.   20
coefficient for the health shock variable alone is insignificant.  In a big family, in the 
event that a family member gets sick, siblings can share the burden of care, thereby 
acting as a buffer against the shock.  The negative and significant coefficient for the 
interactive term of labor and health in the first specification indicates that in households 
lacking working age members, getting sick is highly related to loss of income.  As rural 
China ages in the next few decades, health problems are likely to take a bigger toll on 
rural income if the current family-based system of healthcare prevails.  
Table 5.  Result of Income Determinants Regression 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variable  Coefficient   t-value  Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient   t-value 
Lnhhsize    -0.616   -7.430**   -0.605  -7.350** -0.575  -6.490** -0.564    -6.420** 
Hhrelg    -0.016   -0.150   -0.016  -0.150 -0.013  -0.120 -0.013    -0.120 
Hhnaty    -0.045   -0.450   -0.055  -0.560 -0.047  -0.480 -0.057    -0.580 
Hhmarg    0.049   0.340   0.034 0.240  0.090 0.640  0.077    0.540 
Hhsex    -0.067   -0.590   -0.076  -0.650 -0.067  -0.590 -0.075    -0.650 
Hhage *100  -0.044   -0.150   -0.051  -0.170 -0.055  -0.180 -0.062    -0.210 
Maxeduh    0.042   1.930*   0.042 1.910*  0.040 1.840*  0.040    1.810* 
Maxeduh 2   -0.001   -0.500   -0.001  -0.530 -0.001  -0.460 -0.001    -0.490 
Trainingh    0.307   2.900**   0.315 2.960**  0.310 2.910**  0.319    2.980** 
Laborh    0.105   0.690   0.119 0.790  0.089 0.580  0.103    0.680 
Oldh    0.087   0.380   -0.039  -0.180 0.063  0.280  -0.066    -0.300 
Bigsick    0.084   1.230   -0.008  -0.130 0.084  1.240  -0.009    -0.150 
Oldh*Bigsick    -0.562   -2.920**       -0.569  -2.880**     
Sc    0.123   1.530   0.134  1.690* 0.127  1.590 0.139    1.750* 
Partyh    0.266   2.270**   0.266 2.230**  0.243 2.050**  0.242    2.010** 
Elec    0.166   1.230   0.132 0.970  0.177 1.300  0.143    1.040 
Asset    0.054   0.980   0.053 0.970  0.048 0.880  0.048    0.870 
Lnlivst    0.180   3.120**   0.178 3.090**  0.190 3.290**  0.189    3.260** 
Pirrland    0.112   0.940   0.105 0.880  0.119 1.020  0.113    0.970 
Pland    0.140   3.290**   0.143  3.340**         
Pcland            0.187  3.750**  0.191    3.800** 
Prland            0.072  0.790  0.071   0.780 
_cons    7.299   19.430**   7.356 19.410**  7.185 18.900**  7.241   18.910* 
Obs    798 798 798 798 
Adjusted-R2 0.279  0.272  0.282  0.275 
Note: Due to missing values for a few variables, the total number of observations in the regression drops to 
798 from 803..  *Significant at 10%..  **Significant at 5%.    21
Among the set of household characteristic variables, only household size is 
statistically significant and negative.  Among the human capital variables, having the 
highest year of schooling among family members and having training experience are 
strongly related to greater per capita income. 
In terms of the role of social and political capital, being a Communist Party 
member is associated with greater income.  Because social and political capital is largely 
concentrated in a small group of people, it may widen inequality.  Among the last group 
of variables on household assets, per capita arable land area (a measure of quantity) and 
the number of draft animals are both highly significant.  
The coefficient for the contracted landholdings is significantly positive.  In 
Guizhou Province, because land has not been readjusted since the rural reforms of the 
early 1980s, land distribution has become increasingly uneven due to demographic 
changes.  As agricultural income is highly correlated with land, the land tenure 
arrangement may be an important explanatory factor for the observed inequality among 
farmers in a village.
15  In principle, a well-functioning land rental market can help 
mitigate the problem.  However, the coefficient for the variable of rented land is positive 
yet insignificant.  Further research is required to evaluate the development of land rental 
markets.  
 
                                                 
15 The dummy variables for natural villages are statistically significant but are not reported here.   22
IV.  INEQUALITY ACROSS VILLAGES 
An administrative village in most of Guizhou Province is quite different from a 
natural village.  Rural residents in general cluster within natural villages, instead of 
administrative villages, which implies that there may be greater variations in natural 
resource endowment even within the same administrative village.  However, because the 
size of a natural village is usually small, a cluster of natural villages is combined to form 
an administrative village, in order to have enough scale to provide basic public goods and 
service.  On average, in our sample, each administrative village is composed of more than 
four natural villages.  The more remote an administrative village, the higher the number 
of natural villages included.  As shown in Table 1, in the townships of Chengguan and 
Maguan, which have vast plains, there are only two to three natural villages in each 
administrative village.  In the more remote and mountainous Houchang and Bulang 
townships, administrative villages on average include more than six natural villages.  
 
Table 6.  Inequality across Villages  
Natural village  Administrative village  Administrative/ 
Natural (%) 
Township  Gini GE Gini GE  Gini  GE 
Chengguan 0.346  0.221  0.259  0.103  74.9  46.6
Houchang 0.258  0.110  0.138  0.032  53.5  29.1
Bulang 0.317  0.158  0.175  0.046  55.2  29.1
Maguan 0.238  0.092  0.183  0.056  76.9  60.9
Overall 0.319  0.181  0.215  0.075  67.4  41.4
How even is income distribution across natural villages? Table 6 lays out the 
overall inequality across natural and administrative villages.  In this table, the unit of 
observation for calculating inequality is natural villages and administrative villages, 
instead of households.  Therefore, the inequality figures measure the variation across the   23
spatial units of natural and administrative villages.  Because the large variation within 
natural villages is hidden, the overall natural village inequality (Gini coefficient) is 0.319, 
smaller than income inequality measured at the household level.  In the same vain, the 
overall inequality at the aggregate administrative village level is 0.215.  
Among the four townships, village inequality is greatest in Chengguan.  Distance 
to the county seat may be one of the major determinants of village performance.  In the 
more developed and flat Chengguan and Maguan townships, natural village inequality 
can be explained by variations across administrative villages more than in the other two 
less-developed townships.  In hilly and remote areas, the economic development level 
primarily depends upon natural resource endowment, such as land and water.  Therefore, 
the difference in natural resource endowment plays a big role in explaining the rather 
large variation within administrative villages.  In the plain areas, the variation in natural 
resource endowment from village to village is relatively small; therefore, the difference 
across administrative villages plays a more decisive role.   
Having observed the patterns of village inequality, the question arises: what are 
the major determinants of the large variations observed between villages? Table 7 
presents the regressions on the correlates of per capita income at the natural village level 
and township dummy variables.  The first specification includes only variables at the 
natural village level.  The first two variables measure the location and connectivity of the 
natural village.  The coefficient for road connection is positive with a significance level 
of 0.117.  The coefficient for distance to the nearby town center is significantly negative, 
suggesting that remoteness does matter for economic development.  In terms of social 
variables, we include in the regression the proportion of Han ethnicity, whether there is a 
temple or church in the village, and how many people from the village serve on the 
village council.  The ethnicity variable is positively significant, implying that villages   24
with more minority ethnic groups perform worse.  The more people from the natural 
village serve on the village council, the more developed in terms of per capita income is 
the natural village.  Finally, labor quality, measured as the share of the labor force with 
secondary or higher level of education, is positively correlated with the overall income 
level.  
Table 7.  Correlates of Per Capita Income at the Natural Village Level 
Model 1  Model 2   
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Variables at the administrative village level      
Share of labor engaged in agricultural production      -0.002  -1.94* 
The longest distance between two natural 
villages within the administrative village (km)  
   -0.042  -2.48** 
Important decisions made by village party 
secretaries or upper-level governments 
   -0.181  -1.76* 
Subjected to natural disaster in 2004      -0.117  1.63 
Variables at the natural village level      
Having a road connection (1 is yes and 0 is no)  0.117  1.63  0.118  1.62 
Distance to the nearest town (km in log)    -0.056  -2.31**  -0.042  -1.72** 
Per capita arable land area (mu/person in log)  0.084  1.75*  0.043  0.79 
The share of flat land in total arable land  0.153  1.35  0.171  1.60 
Whether water is a problem in the dry season  -0.093  -1.46  0.215  0.80 
Share of Han ethnicity in total population  0.002  2.11**  0.002  2.22** 
Whether there is a temple in the natural  village 0.073 1.00 0.022 0.31 
Share of labor force with secondary or higher 
level of education 
0.238 2.42** 0.201  2.03* 
Number of people from the natural village who 
serve on village council  
0.103 1.83* 0.088  1.55 
Test for township dummy variables (p value)  0.004  0.039 
Number of observations   276  276 
Adjusted R
2 0.225  0.269 
Note: Dummy variables for townships are included but not reported in both specifications.  
* Significant at the 10% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
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To check the robustness of the results, in the second specification, we add several 
variables at the administrative village level.  The first variable, the share of the labor 
force engaged in agricultural production, captures the degree of labor market 
development.  The negative coefficient for this variable suggests that villages with access 
to nonfarm opportunities are better off.  The second variable is the distance between the 
two farthest natural villages within an administrative village, which aims to measure the 
spread of a natural village.  The coefficient for the variable is significantly negative.  
When natural villages are clustered, agglomeration has a positive effect on income.  The 
third variable is a dummy variable measuring whether villages suffered from natural 
disasters (drought, plant diseases, or animal diseases) during 2004.  It has a negative 
correlation with the outcome variable at the natural village level.  
When the three variables are added at the administrative village level, the 
coefficients for three variables, Han ethnic group, distance to town centers, and labor 
quality, turn out to be robust in the two specifications.  Improving the connectivity of 
villages and the education level of the labor force in poor regions can help improve both 
efficiency and equity.  
 26 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on primary surveys at the household, natural village, and administrative 
village levels, this paper analyzes the patterns of village inequality in western China.  
Several findings emerge from the analysis. First, access to land plays a large role in 
explaining the overall inequality within the village. This is because agriculture is still the 
most important source of farmers’ income, accounting for more than 70 percent of total 
income.  Since Guizhou Province has adopted a strict land policy of “never adjusting land 
regardless of birth or death,” with demographic changes, access to land is likely to 
become increasingly unequal.  Although secure land tenure is certainly important for 
encouraging farmers to make investments in their land, the increasingly uneven 
distribution of land may turn out to be a key factor for large rural inequality if agriculture 
prevails as the major income source.  
The second most important asset for farmers is their human capital, including 
health and education.  This research shows that expenses for medical care rank first in 
overall expenditure inequality.  Because of high medical expenses, most farmers refuse to 
see a doctor when they ill.  In households with few family members of prime working 
age, falling sick is equivalent to a disaster, directly driving the household into poverty.  
The proportion of households that reported selling blood also sends an alarming signal 
about the plight of farmers in the poor regions.  Although selling blood can help generate 
much needed cash to overcome budget constraints in the short run, in the long run, it will 
harm farmers’ health, their most precious human capital.  The vicious circle may dampen 
income inequality.  
This study shows that access to nonfarm employment has been one of the major 
sources of income inequality within the village among households.  The share of 
remittance is relatively small compared to the large number of migrants working in the   27
coastal areas. Even today, there are still various implicit and explicit restrictions in hiring 
rural migrants in various coastal cities, such as quotas and registrations (Zhao, 2003). 
They have to pay higher fees to access to education, health, and social welfare that are 
entitled to the urban residents. These factors have severely distorted labor markets and 
weakened the remittance linkages between coastal and interior regions.  
We also find government transfers have a minimal influence on farmers’ income, 
largely because the amount of transfers is so small.  Because of the high targeting cost, it 
is difficult to improve rural income inequality through greater transfers.  Our survey also 
shows that farmers receive negligible income from natural resources, such as collective 
forests and coal mines.  In China, these natural resources nominally belong to the state 
and farmers have no right to a share of the rent.  With the booming of natural resource 
sectors, the problem has become more pronounced.  Such a phenomenon indicates that 
the institutional roots of inequality in rural areas may be deeper than previously thought.  
To eliminate poverty and reduce inequality in rural areas, it is critical to reform the 
property rights arrangement on resources, including land and nonland resources.   
Otherwise, it is difficult to increase the income of the poor and to reduce the income gap 
by relying primarily on fiscal transfers. 
Finally, the survey at the natural village level demonstrates a large degree of 
inequality across villages.  Location does make a difference in the wellbeing of many 
rural people.  Therefore, when targeting the poor, both villages and households should be 
considered.  As labor quality is positively related to income level at the natural village 
level, improving rural education plays a positive role in achieving both equity and 
efficiency.    28
APPENDIX 
The questionnaires on income and expenditures are modified versions of those 
used by the Rural Survey Organization of the National Bureau of Statistics, China Total 
expenditure refers to the sum of expenses of rural households for production (breeding, 
fertilizers, pesticides, and so on), consumption (food, clothes, durables, fuel, and so 
forth), and transfers.  Total income refers to the sum of income earned from various 
sources by the rural households and their members during the reference period, including 
agricultural income, wage income, and income from household operations.  Net income 
is equal to the total income minus corresponding expenses, such as household operation 
expenses, taxes and fees, depreciation of fixed assets for production, and gifts to people 
outside the village.  The gift exchanges within villages are not counted because of the 
difficulty of disentangling the historical transactions in a snapshot survey.  The 
expenditures on major production equipment and draft animals are not included as 
household operation expenses of the current period to avoid negative values.  
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